Elster does not take a position on the proper ends of collective action, nor does he take a position on the causal connection between the design of an institution and the likelihood of it producing certain outcomes. There are two important constraints on the ambitions of the book. In light of this, the book seeks to show how various factors detrimental to successful decision-making – in particular, self-interest, prejudice, bias, and passion – can be mitigated through careful institutional design.
Elster puts the point strongly, perhaps more strongly than Bentham: his book is not concerned with the moral validity of ends, but with the removal of obstacles that would impede the achievement of the ends that actors wish to pursue (38). Rather than setting rules designed to produce particular outcomes, the Benthamite strategy advocates the creation of structures through which actors can successfully identify the public interest, as they understand it, and adopt measures that will achieve the goals they seek. He draws inspiration from the work of Jeremy Bentham.
In Securities Against Misrule Elster reflects on the ways in which institutional design can remove obstacles to good decision-making. Most of us who write on constitutions are influenced – directly or indirectly – by his work. Over the course of many books, Elster’s attention to the institutions of the constitution, and the ways in which rules can structure the decision-making within those institutions, has helped define the agenda for a discipline. Most of modern constitutional scholarship – or rather, most of the interesting part of modern constitutional scholarship – owes him a great debt. Jon Elster’s contribution to constitutional scholarship has been profound. View INSTITUTIONAL CURES FOR COGNITIVE AILMENTS Review of SECURITIES AGAINST MISRULE : Juries, Assemblies, Elections, by Jon Elster Institutional Cures For Cognitive Ailments
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